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The Sudpolitik of the Brandt Commission:
visionary or wishful thinking?
In the midst of a major economic crisis in the world
economy the market is booming for prophets of doom
or, alternatively, of hope for new opportunities. The
problems, though, now facing us are so profound and
complex that any serious attempt not only to describe
what is taking placean area which is increasingly
flooded by masses of opinions and writingsbut to
propose specific and major international co-operative
actions merits close and thorough evaluation. This is
the case of the Report drafted by the Independent
Commission on International Development Issues under
the chairmanship of Willy Brandt.
Admittedly, the Report includes no individually novel
suggestion for improving economic relations between
the haves and the have-nots in the world economy. It
also lacks any plain speaking about the reasons for the
present stalemate in and/or the absence of any
meaningful negotiations between the 'North' (both
Northwest as well as Northeast) and the 'South'. Yet, it
represents one of the most comprehensive and far
reaching policy packages for needed changes in the
relations between rich and poor countries. The prestige
and international recognition of the Commission's
members add special weight to its recommendations.
The latter, as the report states,
are not revolutionary... [but! part of a process of
negotiated reform and restructuring 1 66J.
Ideas and particularly southern initiatives which in the
past were received with scepticism and, in certain
cases, with open hostility by spokesmen for traditional
'Northern' orthodoxy or by related vested interests in
the South, are made 'respectable' by their inclusion in
the Brandt Report.
In the proposals presented by the Commission, a
central elementin what the report refers to as 'a
mutuality of interests' between North and South-
concerns the massive transfer of financial resources
from the rich to the poor countries. The Commision
members wrote:
Above all, we believe that a large scale transfer of
resources to tile South can make a major impact on
'lhis article is to be included in a book of comments on the Brandt
Report, prepared by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Bonn. and published
by Maurice Temple Smith Ltd of London in Summer 1981.
Bulletin, 1981. vol 12 no 2, Institute of Development Studies. Sussex
growth in both the South and the North and help to
revive the flagging economy Ip 36 of the Report I.
In the past, national deficit finance and related Keynesian
policies helped smooth out the oscillations of business
cycles in individual economies. In a similar manner,
world-wide demand managementthrough inter-
national Keynesianism directed to selected and major
purchasing needs of the Southis proposed by the
Brandt Commission in order to help relieve the world
from the hardships of stagflation facing us today.
In its specific contents, then, this proposal addresses
itself not only to the concern for international co-
operation to alleviate the inhuman conditions of mass
poverty and suffering afflicting hundreds of million
people in the developing countries (for whom repeated
and compassionate references abound in the Report's
contents); instead, it proposes measures whichwith
an eye on the political acceptability of its policy
requirementsreflect an expression of enlightened
self-interest by the North. In plain language, the market
prospects from the needs of the 700-800 million people
living in destitute conditions in the South and from the
consumption and investment requirements of their
more fortunate neighbours also in the South will
provide a much needed stimulus for the sluggish
economies of the North. According to the Report's
expectations, the resulting growth in economic activity
will help alleviate unemployment in the North, which
presently reaches a figure of about 18 million people
in the OECD countries. It will also put into use some
of the under-utilised capacity also in the North. This
redundant capacity has been estimated to represent at
least $200 bn in terms of annual potential output.
The apparent economic sense of this argument borrows
its credibility from the undeniable fact that the growth
prospects of the markets of the South are far greater
than the existing trends in the structures of the saturated
Northern markets and in the faltering productivity
growth in the industrialised economies. The report
presents some empirical evidence on these issues leg
pp 70, 178, 2381. There is, though, a potentially significant
exception to this dim long-term picture for macro-
economic dynamism originating from within some of
the economies of the North in the future. This might
materialise if a Schumpeterian wave of new investments
and significant productivity increases is prompted by
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radically new technological developments. Such
candidates include the massive industrial applications
of micro-processors in the remaining years of this
century and, extending to the post-2000 period, the
evolutions in bio-engineering and in non-traditional
forms of energy. The Brandt Report, though, rightly
focuses its attention to the more immediate future and
the extraordinary economic and political risks embedded
in the present economic crisis. Its policy prescriptions
in this respect are Keynesian.
In evaluating these policy recommendations one has
first to concentrate on the fundamental assumptions
upon which the Brandt Report bases its thesis. For the
reasons presented in the section which follows we find
the underlying assumptions of the Report's proposals
on international Keynesianism to be quite false. Also,
the political chances for initiating such proposals are,
in our judgement, a non-starter. Finally, the practical
procedures for implementing them remain, in technical
terms, unexplored and mostly at variance with the
demands of power relations and established interests
in the world economy. Interdependence between North
and South does not imply mutuality of interests. There
exist only a very small number of issuesthe most
important of which concerns the chaotic state of the
present international monetary 'non-system' - where
a resolution of conflicts can render interests compatible
even if they are not common. The possibilities for
enacting policies on international Keynesianism and
their claimed implications, though, as they are presented
in the Brandt Report, constitute more the product of
wishful thinking than of an effective and visionary
world policy alternative.
A more cynical interpreter of this proposal could
seein the guise of a 'mutually benefiting' North-
South strategya veiled attempt by the North to
simply get hold of and control the use of the mounting
OPEC financial surpluses. In practice, the transfer of
resources talked about in the Report would not come
simply from the savings of the Northern countries but
from recycled petro-currencies. This would, in turn,
limit the chances of Third World initiatives to use the
financial surpluses of the oil producers as a key source
of leverage to negotiate a more effective restructuring
in parts of the institutional machinery governing
international economic relations. In this respect the
Brandt Report proposalsdespite conscious attempts
to include reciprocal concessions (like those presented
in the Emergency Programme)can be considered to
be the detriment of any fundamental North-South
negotiations. The latter will lead to a change in the
presently skewed nature of relations between the two
parts only if they are based on historical processes and
situations which also imply a more diversified and
balanced economic power base in the world economy.
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The Assumptions and Political Realities of
International Keynesianism
There are two crucial assumptions on which the
Brandt Report bases its proposals on international
Keynesianism. Both of them are highly questionable.
First, it argues that world peace and ultimately the
security of the Northern countries are threatened by
the continuing underdevelopment of the South. Thus,
it is implied that Northern interests, in this context, are
homogeneous and that their major concerns relate to
the evolutions in the South. The contours, though, of
economic and political conflict now confronting the
world community do not have their epicentres on the
North-South axis. Instead, they basically concern intra-
OECD economic rivalry (where very serious differences
exist) as well as the political and military rivalry
between East and West. This does not, though, imply
that conflicts involving the South (eg Iran-Iraq, sub-
Saharan African conflicts, convulsions in Central
America and the Caribbean) will not be used as a
convenient base for thrashing out North-North conflicts.
The actual locus and the reasons for or origin of
conflict need not coincide. The misplaced emphasis,
though, for world peace and security on North-South
conflicting interests baffles the reader of the Brandt
Report, particularly in view of the politically seasoned
members of the Commission on matters involving
international relations.
The divergence of interests within the North implies
quite different attitudes by the OECD countries on
restructuring the world economic system while using
the South as growth platform. In the case of the US the
cost of inaction in international economic restructur-
ing is much smaller as compared to the other OECD
countries. In fact the US will still wish to linger on the
multiple privileges it has enjoyed in the system of 'Pax
Americana', especially in the use of the dollar as an
international reserve currency (which General de
Gaulle referred to as the US's 'exorbitant privilege')
and in the activities of its transnationals. It will, thus,
avoid any hastening in changing the fundamentals of
present international economic relations and concentrate
its attention (including the use of Keynesian economics)
on military issuevis-à-vis the USSR, domestic economic
restructuring and investments in key high technology
areas.
The two losers of World War Il and main growth
economies in the North today. the Federal Republic
of Germany and Japan. have much more serious
vested interests in a controlled evolution in the world
economic system. Such a change will be needed to
accompany their own ascendancy to the club of world
economicpowers, in which the US was previously the
sole member. Also both of them, but especially Japan,
are much more critically dependent than the US on
the markets and resources of the South. (lt is no
accident that a West German statesman of the stature
of Willy Brandt was chairman of the Commission.) In
contrast, other Northern countries with weakened
internal economic structures, like the UK, would
hardly be willing to participate in a massive transfer of
resources to the South from which other more dynamic
economies within the OECD will be the major
beneficiaries. (This was amply demonstrated by Mrs
Thatchers position on this matter in the summit of
Western heads of state last summer.)
Finally, although the Eastern European countries are
obviously hurt by the world economic crisis, they
would not be likely to contribute to any serious
softening of the intra-OECD economic rivalry by
opening up a massive opportunity through stepped-up
Northern investments in the South. Anyhow, several
of them (like Poland) find themselves in need of
massive international capital transfers to and not from
them. Also the direct economic advantages of the
Northeast from such an evolution could hardly be
compared with what the Northwest as a whole might
gain. This is not only because the extent of involvement
of Eastern European companies with international
dealings in the Third World cannot be compared with
the size of equivalent participation of western originated
transnationals. Instead it also has to do with the nature
of commitments within the COMECON, particularly
vis-à-vis the USSR. These intra-Eastern European
economic commitments condition the extent of
corresponding interactions with the rest of the world.
Thus, the North is hardly homogeneous: its constituent
countries view their relations with the South in the
context of quite different interests. The significant
differences in national characteristics and in the resulting
interests about international relations which exist
between Bangladesh, Kuwait and Brazil are equally
severe in the cases of the UK, Japan and the US and
between those OECD countries and Rumania or the
USSR.
The second key and erroneous assumption of the
Brandt Report is that a slower level of economic
activity with unemployment and a certain amount of
relatively high inflation rates are to the detriment of
all interested parties in the North. This assumption
originates from the Northern heritage of a near full
employment growth with relatively low inflation rates
of the first post war quarter century which contrasted
with the traumatic experience of the 1930s. In fact, the
present reverse situation despite political rhetoric to
the contrarycan be considered as a blessing in
disguise for pivotal Northern interests. There are two
main reasons for this.
First, a higher world wide economic growth rate,
within the present limits imposed on the energy front,
could have profound repercussions on the distribution
of economic and non-economic power between the
North and the OPEC countries. The fact that alternative
high growth scenarios approach in their implications
some of the writings in political and economic science
fiction (je books like The Crash of 79) does not make
them inherently improbable.
Second, in view of the fact that, in a number of cases in
the pre-mid 1970s, wage increases in the North often
tended to be higher than productivity increases, the
present inflation rates couldif appropriately
managed - provide an important monetary support
for partially checking the falling rate of profit in
ndustry. The impact of inflation on real wage rates
could offset at least part of the forces which have led
to a drop in profitability. Furthermore, slower economic
growth rates and mounting unemployment could -
within certain politically tolerable levelsalter the
relative power of organised economic groups within
the increasingly bargain-oriented nature of Northern
societies.
During periods of high growth rate, some groups can
gain without this necessarily implying an absolute loss
for others. But during low growth periods, the
preservation of certain economic performance (such
as the level of profit) requires much more serious
sacrifices by the rest. This is what is happening today
with the real wage rate and the degree of acceptable
unemployment in the North. Within certain limits
imposed by political realities, perceptions not only of
the acceptability hut also of the necessity of such
unemployment levels in the North have drastically
changed from what was considered appropriate five
or ten years ago.
The issue, then, of stepped-up Northern investments
in the South is not just whether additional overall
inflationary pressures will be absorbed by existing
excess capacity in the North. (Incidentally the Brandt
Report does not examine fully these implications and
provides technically rather unconvincing arguments
on the resulting net trade flows between North and
South when it discusses these matters.) Instead, the
key concern rests on much more precisely defined
and strategic issues. These have to do with whether
higher economic growth rates in the world economy
will so alter the relative power internationally (with
respect to OPEC) and nationally (with respect to the
trade unions) that 'Northern interests' will find themselves
in considerable jeopardy. Even more than the top
management in business, the strongest supporter for
higher growth rates in the world economy today
should be the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO).
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The former can at least console itself that settlements
on higher wage rates can be checked both with respect
to price increases (which affect real wages and real
profits) and also with respect to productivity changes
(which directly affect the profit rate, real and monetary).
In contrast, the PLO will rightly feel that slower
growth rates in the world economy will diminish the
prospects for Palestinian independence. Since a
significant part of the PLO's political power comes
today from the pressure that the Arab oil exporters
can exert on the West. the prospects for Palestine
statehood are very much a function of the rate of
irowth of the world economy in the remaining years
of this century.
There exist a number of examplesinternationally,
regionally and nationally which demonstrate that
the West has already examined and rejected any
serious commitment to a Keynesian boost of the
world economy whether along the lines proposed in
the Brandt Report or otherwise. For example, four
years before the Brandt Commission's recommendations,
President Kreisky of Austria proposed a major transfer
of OECD resources to the South as a stimulus not only
to development but also to the then faltering growth
rates in the West. Similar proposals were formally
made at OECD a year later by representatives of
Norway and of the then UK Government. These
proposals were quickly lost without trace in the agenda
of Western priority areas. Even intra-OECD Keynesian
stimulus of the 'locomotive' type (using the Japanese
and West German economies as 'engines') or later of
the 'convoy' variety proved non-starters. Furthermore,
a proposal was aired in mid 1970s by the West German
Social Democratic party to use the occasion of the
second enlargement of the European Community for
a new 'Marshall plan' in Southern Europe. Its objective
consisted in firmly securing in political terms the
southern flank of the Community which was emerging
from years of dictatorial rule. This was quickly shelved
even by the West German social-democrat dominated
Government. Finally, the monetarist contractionary
policies dominating national economic thinking in
practically the whole of the OECDeven, as in the
case of the UK, to the detriment of needed industrial
restructuringhardly provide a receptive environment
for Keynesianist expansionism. If such policies are
rejected at home at the political risk of losing voters'
support, how can they be implemented internationally
where the first round beneficiaries will be citizens of
'other' countries?
The authors of the Brandt Report not only misread
the political realities of the North but, on this subject,
took some highly questionable positions on the meaning
and requirements of the development process in the
South. In a remarkable statement, on p43, the Report
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claims that the South needs, above all, finance. In the
context of the Pearson Commission a few decades
ago, when North-South relations were seen exclusively
under the prism of foreign aid and when the analysis of
development requirements was dominated by 'northern
thinking', such conceptual blunders would be
understandable. One wonders though, how in the
Brandt Commission, despite the content and sensitivity
of some of its analysis on the political and organisational
realities of the developing countries, it can be perceived
that 'above all' more finance for the regimes of Pinochet,
Mobutu or Marcos will promote development! Even
on strictly statistical grounds. it would have been
necessarywhen the Brandt Report talks about capital
transfersto acknowledge that the North is presently
a net capital importer from and not an exporter of
financial resources to the South.
Far more important, though, than the quantitative
aspects of capital transfers between North and South
relations are the qualitative implications which such
international linkages have for the way in which
societies in the South organise the process of
accumulation and the development of the forces of
production. In this case the role played by the
transnational enterprises is central. We turn now to
evaluate briefly the proposals of the Brandt Commission
on this topic.
The Brandt Report on the Transnational
Enterprises
The implications of the proposed capital transfers
from the North to the South bear with them a key
concern about the operationalconditionalit imposed
by such international financial flows. By conditionality
we do not refer here to the well-known macro-economic
policy constraints imposed characteristically by the
lMFon borrowers. (It is a credit to the Brandt Report
that, within the constraints of its membership and the
need for acceptability in the seats of power, it explicitly
recognises and calls for a change in the management
of international monetary relations. In this context it
acknowledges the demonstrably discriminatory effects
that the latter have had up to now on the process of
development in the Third World.1 It has also significantly
called for an increase in programme rather than
project finance.) Instead we refer here to the link
between the proposed financing of enhanced activities
in developing countries, the stimulus to net northern
In contrast, the hard line US policies on these matters continue to
present a different perception of the functioning of the international
monetary system. The Assistant Secretary of Treasury of the US. F.
Bergsten. declared at the recent joint session of the World Bank and
the IMF that the Third World countries] are tragically misguided.
These institutions are the ones that do the most for those guys.
Cynicism is undoubtedly one of the primary features of international
politics, particularly when it is practised towards the weakest members
of the international community.
exports and the activities of the transnational
enterprises.
As far as the North is concerned the key areaswhich
appear in the package of policies recommended by
the Report to make operational use of additional
finances granted to the Southare not likely to be
covered by the small and medium sized firms of the
North nor by the unemployed among its youth or
certain regionally or prOfessionally hurt activities.
Instead, the key beneficiariesin energy exploration
and exploitation, in mineral processing, in massive
irrigation plans, etcare the large transnational
enterprises and certain machinery producers, particularly
t hose firms characterised by high capital and or certain
skill intensity.
As far as the South is concerned, an internationally
orchestrated financial flow which will bear the label of
capital transfers from the North to the South and
whose stated objective will be directly to promote
export growth from the North, is bound to intensify
the South's dependence on the transnationals. An
unbundling of the foreign investment/technology
package in, let us say, Malaysia, which will promote
the export of engineering services from India, capital
goods from Brazil, steel products from South Korea
and managerial services from Argentina. will hardly
be consistent with the need directly to promote exports
from the North. Obviously, the developing countries'
exporters will in themselves be importers of goods and
services from the North. Yet, these would have come
about anyhow with alternative (including financial)
strategies which could increase the import potential of
developing countries. In this case there is need openly
to acknowledge the existing conflict of economic
interests between South and North.
The objective of increasing the bargaining position of
developing countries vis-d-vis the transnationals and
the Report's call for international action on this matter
appear to be related more to the renegotiation of the
'terms of dependence' on technology suppliers than to
any effective alteration of the structure of productive
relations in the world economy. In fact. what is proposed
involves the transfer of international financial resources
which will further strengthen the presence of
transnational enterprises in developing countries.
There are, though. certain important cases with respect
to which the Brandt Report acknowledges the need
and calls for an increase in the share of developing
countries in the operations of the world economy.
One of them concerns the greater participation of the
Third World in the processing of minerals and
commodities. The implementation of such a strategy
will confront the strong opposition of the transnational
enterprises. After the wave of nationalisations in the
primary production of a large number of minerals and
commodities in the 1960s and early 1970s, vertically
and internationally integrated enterprises consider as
part of their strategic interests the need to maintain
several of their downstream operations out of the
control of developing countries. If the latter, like the
processing activities, are shifted to and become subject
to more effective control by the developing countries,
the transnationals run the risk of losing their oligopolic
control over key operations. Established firms will
thus oppose such a shift and will only reluctantly
participate in a process of relocation under economic
pressure. Such pressure can be effectively exercised if
the firms presently operating are confronted with the
risk of losing (including to other transnationals) their
security of access to sources of supply of primary
inputs. Other Northern interests might not be so
adverse to the transfer of such activities to the South.
These include environmental protection groups in the
North, transnational banks with high liquidity in search
for investment opportunities, machinery and technology
suppliers and policy makers who realise that in certain
caseseg. aluminium production in Japana significant
part of the reported value of output in the North
involves the consumption of energy in which they are
highly deficient.
In other cases though, also endorsed by the Brandt
Report, the promotion of exports from the South
which involve international sourcing activities by the
transnationals will be strongly supported by these
firms in contrast to the opposition of other northern
groups, particularly organised labour. In these
circumstances the South can be used as an inter-
mediary to affect relative power relations within the
North.
In both of the above cases (ie processing and international
sourcing activities) the position of the North will
reflect basically the final outcome of differing intra-
North political and economic positions. Whatever the
Brandt Report (or anybody else) argues on these
matters will need, in order to be pragmatic, to be
based on a prior analysis of the preferences and
pressures exercised within the industrialised countries
and not simply on the expressed needs of the South.
Measures Proposed on the Transnationals
Among all the sections of the Brandt Report, perhaps
the least imaginative and most limited in terms of the
importance of specific proposals which will favour the
South is that which concretely concerns itself with the
operations of transnational enterprises. In the proposed
Regime for International Investment' and the related
sections of that chapter, the Report endorses several
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of the hardest positions of the OECD countries,
particularly the inducement:
to participate in intergovernmental agreements
under which the governments of home countries
insure foreign investment operations of their
transnationals and thus, through a process of
subrogation, elevate potential and actual conflicts
between enterprises and host governments to the
level of conflict between governments (a proposition
which countervenes expressed decisions of several
developing countries, like those of the Andean
Pact);
to accept multilateral bodies for the settlement of
disputes, 'in addition, or as an alternative, to national
tribunals' (italics added), (a proposition which is
opposed by several national and regional decisions
in developing countries, eg, the Calvo Doctrine);
C) to form 'an international procedure for discussions
and consultations on measures affecting direct
investment and the activities of transnational
corporations' (italics added), (a proposition which
will tend to place international pressures on national
sovereignty when the latter is exercised through the
introduction of policies which affect the interests of
transnational enterprises).
In other cases which concern the specific practices
and operations of the transnational enterprises the
proposals of the Brandt Reportdepending on the
subject matterfall into categories which can be
characterised as utopian, partial, belonging to the
case of the 'irrelevant alternative' or even of failing
adequately to examine certain fundamental issues.
The Utopian approach is most apparent in the call for
'sharing' technology between the North and South,
and for the effective 'transfer' of such technology.
This simply does not recognise the meaning and origin
of economic power in the structures of contemporary
markets and the importance of control or captivity
over the productive know-how. Also, the proposal for
international action to promote more extensive and
effective disclosure of information by the transnationals
does not recognise that any serious world cooperation
on this issue has already been opposed by the North in
view of the expressed negative reaction of its
transnationals. Instead, the initiatives of the United
Nations in making such activities operational presently
find themselves drowned in the swamps of endless
international committee work.
One of the more inadequate analyses of issues on
world business practices concerns the proposals of the
Report on transfer pricing. These are largely circum-
vented in preference to recommendations on tax
harmonisation policies and the elimination of resort to
tax havens. No frank discussion is undertaken on how
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the substantial part of world trade which takes place
through intra-firm exchanges constitutes today an
area of major conflicting interest. Such trade practices
represent a well organised and quantitatively very
important channel for implicit income transfers
internationally. It also covers one of the more important
exercises of what is traditionally referred to as restrictive
business practices.
Equally, no frank references are made to the discrimina-
tory role played by or, in other cases, the absence of
participation of these enterprises in confronting the
needs of the world's poor. Finally, the insistence on
codes of conduct constitutes a misplaced emphasis.
The primary (perhaps only) contribution of such codes
is the promotion of public discussion and awareness
on issues concerning the transnationals, and this has
already been done by United Nations initiatives. Its
reiteration diverts attention from alternatives which
are undoubtedly much more serious to Southern
interests. Internationally agreed rules on savoir faire
on these matters simply do not touch the core of
control and decision making which are central to the
operations of transnational enterprises. The interminable
negotiations on codes tend to blur the need for
continuously bringing to the fore the combined impact
of requisite political will, technical knowledge and
economic power to deal with these enterprises.
Concluding Remarks
The Brandt Report needs to be judged according to
the impact it is likely to have as a major opinion
forming and policy influencing document in the evolution
of North-South relations. Such impact will, in turn,
depend on the relevance of the subjects it covers, the
validity of its analysis and conclusions and finally, the
possibilities of influencing the perceptions and decisions
of policy makers and those to whom they are
accountable. Novelty, which the Report lacks, is not a
criterion here, since this is not an academic work;
validity and effectiveness, though, are of central im-
portance.
Contrary to the largely one-dimensional nature of the
Pearson Report which preceded the work of the
Brandt Commission, the latter was able to capture and
convey the interdependence of several of the central
problems facing developing countries. Thus, facile
and evasively partial policy solutions, which have
often dominated the agenda of North-South discussions
in the past, are brought into question. Also, the Report
did not accept the institutional base as given but called
for specific reforms. Its value then consists in lending
its support, through an articulate presentation and the
weight of the Commissioners' names, to these two
notions: interdependence of problems, and inadequacy
of existing institutional mechanisms to deal with them.
The usefulness of its impact is pedagogic. It 'legitimises'
some general concerns on development that have
often been expressed in the past but which have not
succeeded in being more broadly accepted.
The validity of its analysis, though, and the political
acceptability of its proposals in the two areas we
examined (namely, the massive transfer of resources
to the South and the activities of the transnational
enterprises) are highly questionable. The Brandt Report
misreads both the political realities of the North and
the essence of some of the efforts of the South in
asserting itself as an emerging force in international
economics relations. In several crucial cases we
concluded that the Report's concrete proposals, in the
two above mentioned areas, will prove harmful to the
interests of developing countries.
Poverty and power in international and domestic
relations are not separable. Although the Brandt Report
preoccupies itself seriously with the first, it only
tangentially touches the essence of the latter. Thus,
the analysis and positions taken did not address
themselves to the field that, in view of their past
experience, the Commissioners should know best. In
their attempt to reach a concensus among themselves,
they failed to present and analyse it as explicitly as
they should.
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